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Blacklisting Through the Official Publication
of Congressional Reports
In order to facilitate efficient and responsive administration of gov-
ernment, information must be freely available to all government
agencies and to the general public. In furtherance of this goal, the
Government Printing Office, upon routine order of either House,
prints several thousand copies of all non-confidential reports produced
by the component bodies of Congress and distributes them to legis-
lators, the Library of Congress, state libraries, other designated deposi-
tories,' and any member of the public who requests a copy. On October
28, 1970, for the first time in history, a federal court in the case of
Hentoff v. Ichord2 permanently enjoined the printing of one of these
official government reports. The House of Representatives promptly
ordered that a slightly modified version of the enjoined report be
printed and distributed despite the injunction, and restrained the
courts from further interference with such publication.
The subject of these extraordinary events is, in its present form,
House Report 91-1732, "Report of Inquiry Concerning Speakers'
Honoraria at Colleges and Universities."4 It is, in popular terms, a
blacklist5 of "subversive elements" in our society. The document re-
sulted from a survey of guest speakers on the nation's college campuses
1. 44 U.S.C. §§ 701, 1718, 1719 (1970).
2. 818 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970).
3. See p. 191 infra.
4. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNAL SECURITY, REPORT OF INQUIRY CONCERNING SPEAKERS'
HONORARIA AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, H.R. Doc. No. 1732, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as H.R. 91-1732]. This is a slightly modified version of an earlier
report, HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNAL SECURITY, LIMITED SURVEY OF HONORARIA GIVEN
SPEAKERS FOR ENGAGEMENTS AT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, H.R. Doc. No. 1607, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter referred to as H.R. 91-16071, which was the document
under examination in the Hentoff case. After the injunction against publication of
H.R. 91-1607, the House ordered that report published in a slightly altered form and
under the new title and designation cited above. For the nature of these alterations, see
note 18 infra. All footnote citations are to the modified version, H.R. 91-1732.
5. For purposes of this Note, the term "blacklist" is used to denote a document
which attributes widely unpopular political beliefs or associations to specified individuals
or organizations. Since the expression is not a legal term of art, factors such as the too-
tivation prompting a document's publication are not included in this definition, al-
though they may be relevant to the constitutionality of such publication. See pp. 215.
28 infra. Moreover, despite the term's negative connotations, it is used here not as a
means of suggesting a legal conclusion but rather as a simple, shorthand method of
delimiting the subject matter under consideration.
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undertaken in the spring of 1970 by the House Internal Security Com-
mittee.6 The survey's purpose was to determine the extent to which
"persons whom we know to be associated with revolutionary groups"T
were using college speaking engagements as a means of financing
their organizations. Drawing upon lists of guest speakers voluntarily
supplied by eighty-three American colleges and universities,8 and basing
its judgments on undisclosed but allegedly "public source material,"0
the Committee determined that sixty-five of these speakers, including
such national figures as Linus Pauling, Benjamin Spock, Muhammed
Ali and Dick Gregory, were members or supporters of allegedly revolu-
tionary organizations.' 0 Although admittedly unable to determine if
any of the honoraria received actually inured to the benefit of those
organizations," the Committee proceeded to draft a report based on
the survey. That document lists by name the selected individuals, char-
acterized as "Pied Pipers of pernicious propaganda,"12 and specifies the
honoraria that each had received from college speaking engagements
over the prior two years and the groups with which each was thought
6. Formerly known as the House Committee on Un-American Activities, the Com-
mittee was renamed in 1969 by H.R. Res. 89, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CoNo. REc. 3723-
24 (1969).
7. H.R. 91-1732, at S.
8. In June of 1970, the Committee mailed letters to 179 selected educational institu-
tions requesting that they furnish "information with regard to honorariums paid to
all guest speakers other than academicians and lecturers who appeared in connection
with courses of instruction" during the 1968-70 school years. Specifically, the institutions
were asked to list all such speakers by name, designate their "group identification or
sponsorship," and describe the manner, amount, source and recipient of each honorarium
payment. Of the 179 institutions solicited, 138 replied. Of these, eighty-three supplied
at least some of the requested information, forty-four were unable to comply either
because of administrative difficulties or because they had had no non-academic speakers
during the specified period, three requested an extension of time, and only eight explic-
itly refused to cooperate. H.R. 91-1752, at 5-6. It should be noted that since subpoenas
had not been issued, these institutions were under no legal obligation to supply this
information.
9. H.R. 91-1732, at 7.
10. Id. at 7-9. For the purpose of this survey, the Committee selected thirteen organi-
zations as relevant to an inquiry into the funding of "revolutionary groups": the Black
Panther Party, the "Chicago Seven," the Communist Party, USA. (and associated youth
groups), the Nation of Islam, the National Committee to Abolish HUAC (which tas
omitted in the modified version of the report, see note 18 infra), the National Mobiliza-
tion Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the New Mobilization Committee to End
the War in Vietnam, the Progressive Labor Party, the Socialist Workers Party, the
Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the Students for a Demo-
cratic Society, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, the
Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, the Young Socialist Alliance, the Youth
International Party (Yippies), and the Workers' World Party. See H.R. 91-1732, at 7. These
organizations were discussed at length in a separate Appendix to the report, and were
variously characterized as "Communist-dominated," "extremist," threats to internal se-
curity, and composed of "hoodlum-type revolutionaries." See H.R. 91-1732, at 26-34. This
Appendix may itself represent an unconstitutional blacklist, not of the selected speakers
but of the organizations themselves.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1178 (D.D.C. 1970).
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to be associated.' 3 On October 14, 1970, this report was filed with the
House of Representatives, which ordered that it be submitted to the
Government Printing Office for official publication.14
One day earlier, Nat Hentoff, a prominent journalist and one of the
sixty-five listed speakers, instituted a class action suit on behalf of all
those named in the report, requesting an injunction against dissemina-
tion of the report by the Public Printer, the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, or any member of the Internal Security Committee. Injunctive
relief was sought on the grounds that publication threatened the plain-
tiffs with irreparable harm by infringing and chilling their First
Amendment rights of expression and association. The district court re-
fused to enjoin the congressional defendants, holding that they were im-
mune from such restraint under the speech and debate clause of the
Constitution.15 It granted the injunction as to the named agents of
Congress, however, holding that:
If a report has no relationship to any existing or future proper leg-
islative purpose and is issued solely for sake of exposure or intimi-
dation, then it exceeds the legislative function of Congress; and
where publication will inhibit free speech and assembly, publica-
tion and distribution in official form at government expense may
be enjoined. This is such a report. 6
Despite the fact that the court order enjoined publication of the of-
fending report "or any portion, restatement or facsimile thereof,
'17
Chairman Richard Ichord of the Internal Security Committee resub-
mitted the report, with only minor alterations,' 8 to the House of Rep-
13. The findings are actually presented in two separate lists: the first stating the
date and honorarium for each speech by a selected individual, and the second repeating
that information under subheadings indicating the organizations with which each speaker
is said to be "identifiable" as an *'officer, member or supporter." H.R. 91-1732, at 7-15.
14. 116 CONG. Rae. E9646-47 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1970).
15. Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1179-80 (D.D.C. 1970).
16. Id. at 1182.
17. Id. at 1183.
18. Chairman Ichord has openly declared that H.R. 91-1732 is merely a "restatement"
of the enjoined H.R. 91-1607, which would appear to make its publication a direct
violation of the court order. See 116 CONG. REc. H11615 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1970) (remarks
of Congressman Ichord). The only significant changes in the new report were the de-
letion of eight individuals and one organization from the lists and the addition of
Appendix IV, which consists of a Defense Department analysis of violent acts com-
mitted against campus ROTC facilities during the 1968.70 school years. The deletions
were probably made for public relations reasons, since the names dropped were those
of Dr. Linus Pauling, a Nobel laureate physicist, and seven members of the National
Committee to Abolish HUAC, the inclusion of whom might have been viewed as a
trifle self-serving. The addition of the ROTC vandalism study was evidently made in
order to give a post-hoc legitimacy to the report as a whole, since such vandalism would
be an obviously legitimate target for congressional legislation for which the report
Vol. 81: 188, 1971
Blacklisting and Publication of Congressional Reports
resentatives. On December 14, 1970, the House, by resolution, ordered
the Public Printer to publish this modified version and restrained all
persons, "whether or not acting under color of office," from interfering
with that publication.19
When the modified report was submitted to the House, plaintiffs
promptly sought an injunction against its publication as well, but the
district court, deciding to avoid further intervention pending review
of its original decision, denied the request.20 Ironically, that denial
itself prevented review of the Hentoff opinion. Since the allegedly
damaging information had already been made public, thereby satisfy-
ing the purposes of Congress and probably rendering the case moot, the
Hentoff defendants decided not to pursue an appeal from the original
order granting the injunction.21 The two important legal questions
raised by the Hentoff case therefore remain unresolved: (1) Do courts
have the power to provide relief for injuries arising from the official
publication and dissemination 2- of a congressional report? (2) Are
there any constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to pub-
lish, in the form of official government reports, blacklists which detri-
mentally affect an individual's freedoms of expression and association?
I. The Availability of a Judicial Remedy
The defendants in Hentoff maintained that both the separation of
powers doctrine and the speech and debate clause23 provide absolute
bars against judicial interference with the official publication of con-
might claim to be useful. See 116 CoNG. REc. H11619 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1970) (remarks
of Congressman Ichord); H.R. 91-1732, at 17. That addition probably has aggravated die
report's threat to the First Amendment freedoms of the listed speakers, for the report as a
whole now implies that they bear responsibility not only for campus violence in gen-
eral but also for the particular acts of destruction described in Appendix 1V. See H.R. 91-
1732, at 16-17.
19. H.R. Res. 1306, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CoNs. REc. HI1603 (daily ed. Dec. 14.
1970).
20. See 116 CONG. Rxc. H11620-21 (daily ed. Dec. 14. 1970).
21. The noncongressional defendants, against whom the original Hentoll injunction
had been issued, had filed an appeal shortly after the opinion was handed down. After
the House ordered publication of the modified report and the district court refused to
enjoin that publication, however, the defendants moved to dismiss their own appeal.
Motion to Dismiss Appeal, Hentoff v. Ichord, No. 24781. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granted that unopposed motion. Id. (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19,
1971). Copies of appellants' motion to dismiss and the resulting court order are on file
with the Yale Law Journal.
22. Although the Hentoff court enjoined the publication of the report then at issue,
the source of the harm-and therefore of concernm-is the public distribution of the
document, not its mere physical reproduction on paper. Throughout this Note, therefore,
the term "publication" will be used to denote both reproduction and public dissemination
of the material.
23. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
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gressional reports. 24 If either contention is correct, the courts would be
required to dismiss all claims seeking relief against the official publi-
cation of congressional blacklists, leaving the victims without a legal
remedy. However, judicial power in this area is not as limited as
the Hentoff defendants suggested.
A. The Separation of Powers
If a government of co-equal branches is to function effectively, those
branches must successfully balance the need to check one another's
excesses against the danger of undue interference with the others'
legitimate functions. In order to achieve this balance, courts have de-
veloped the separation of powers doctrine, which is designed in part
to prevent the judiciary from considering controversies or undertak-
ing policy judgments that are more appropriately decided by one of
the two elected branches of government2
24. 116 CONG. REc. E9647-50 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1970) (Defendant's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
and in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss). The defendants also argued that,
even if these two legal principles failed to bar all judicial remedies, their own First
Amendment rights of expression would protect them from any sanction for their role
in publishing congressional reports. Like the Hentoff proceedings, this Note deals
only with the official publication of blacklists at the order of Congress or one of
its subordinate bodies. To the extent that individual Congressmen and their agents
participate in this process, they are exercising congressional and not personal rights
of expression. Under such circumstances, they cannot claim protection under the
First Amendment, because Congress as an institution is not shielded by that Amend-
ment. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FPEEDONK OF ExPRESSION 700 (1970). This does
not mean that the values associated with the First Amendment-including the creation
of a free marketplace of ideas and the encouragement of public comment on the ac-
tivities of national leaders-are irrelevant to the constitutionality of congressional
blacklisting, but rather that those values are to be considered only insofar as they are
relevant to the constitutional protections that are available to Congress: the speech and
debate clause, the journal of proceedings clause, and the defense of legitimate legislative
function.
It should be noted, however, that if either a Congressman or his agent should attempt
to distribute or reveal the contents of a congressional blacklist on his own (without
orders from a congressional body and through channels other than the Government
Printing Office), he might then be able to claim the protection of the First Amendment
itself for his individual expression. In that event, any attempt by tile victims of tile
blacklist to remedy the harm imposed on them would have to deal with the recent line
of cases insulating critical comment of public figures from liability for libel, except
when malice is shown. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (if the
plaintiff in a libel suit is a "public official," he must prove that the defendant acted
either with knowledge of the falsehood of what was written or with a reckless disregard
for the truth). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1971) (the
Sullivan rule applies to all libel actions dealing with utterances involving "an issue of
public or general concern"); Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971): Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 US. 374 (1967);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); T. EMERSON, THE SYsrEMI OF FREEDoM or Ex-
PREssiON 531-32, 540 (1970).
25. See, e.g., Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 57 (1923) (dictum that the
judiciary may not review the determinations of the other branches as to when or
whether a war has ended); New Orleans Water Works Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471
(1896) (courts may not control the discretion of a municipal assembly to adopt or reject
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In Baker v. Carr,26 the Supreme Court attempted to provide some
guidelines for the application of this general principle. Although
enunciating a series of factors relevant to whether a case constituted
a nonjusticiable "political question,"27 the Baker opinion indicated
that the primary consideration in determining justiciability is the de-
gree to which the constitutional provisions involved in the controversy
provide courts with enforceable judicial standards upon which to base
a decision.28 In Powell v. McCormack," in holding justiciable a Con-
gressman's claim of illegal exclusion by the House, the Court suggested
that aside from the question of whether there existed a "textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue"30 to Congress,
all of the Baker concerns are satisfied, and the issue is therefore jus-
ticiable, if a challenged congressional activity is alleged to have in-
fringed upon a constitutional provision that the courts are competent
to interpret.31 The determination of the constitutionality of govern-
ment publication is not committed exclusively to Congress.32 More-
over, the interpretation of both provisions that a blacklist might be
said to violate, the bill of attainder clause and the First Amendment, is
demonstrably within the competence of courts.3 3 Therefore, judicial
relief against congressional blacklisting would not be barred by the
separation of powers doctrine.34
ordinances); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (Court refused to decide which
of two competing groups constituted the lawful government of Rhode Island); Hearst v.
Black, 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (courts may not enjoin Congress from using information
in its possession for the purposes of conductin; hearings); Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des
Moines, 44 Iowa 505 (1876) (courts may not enjoin enactment of a law by a legislative
body).
26. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (holding that reapportionment of legislative districts does not
present a nonjusticiable political question).
27. Id. at 217.
28. Id. at 226.
29. 395 US. 486 (1969).
30. Id. at 518.
31. Id. at 548-49.
32. See pp. 202-04 infra.
33. Courts have frequently held that threatened infringement of First Amendment
rights may present a justiciable controversy despite the fact that relief would require
interference with the normal functioning of a coordinate branch of government. See,
e.g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) (separation of powers doctrine does
not bar review of congressional investigations); Davis v. Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir
1970) (the doctrine does not bar review of the maintenance of dossiers by congressional
committees); Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (doctrine does not bar
review of the maintenance of arrest records by the Federal Bureau of Investigation).
The bill of attainder clause is itself an implementation of the separation of powers
principle. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). The claim that an act consti-
tutes a bill of attainder must be justiciable, for otherwise Congress, under the guise of
a separation of powers immunity, could violate that very system of checks and balances
by usurping judicial functions. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1946).
34. But see Doe v. McMillan, No. 71-1027, slip op. at 18.20 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 1972),
in which the court held that civil action against those legislative agents who helped
The Yale Law Journal
B. The Speech and Debate Clause
Relief is also not barred, although it is severely limited, by the
speech and debate clause, a constitutional provision designed to shield
individual Congressmen from judicial interference with their official
acts of expression and publication. The clause, which was copied
nearly verbatim from an early English counterpart,83 states that, "The
Senators and Representatives ... for any Speech or Debate in either
House... shall not be questioned in any other Place."8' 0 Similar pro-
visions existed in several states at the time of the Constitution's ratifica-
tion. 37 Indeed, the first authoritative American interpretation of this
rule of government is found in Coffin v. Coffin,38 in which the Su-
preme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that a state legislator's
slanderous statement did not fall within the immunity provided by an
article in the Massachusetts Constitution similar to the federal speech
and debate clause. Speaking for the court, the Chief Judge stated:
I would like to define the article as securing to every member [of
the legislature] exemption from prosecution, for everything said
or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of that of-
fice .... 39
The United States Supreme Court has cited the Coffin formulation
with approval,40 adding that the immunity only extends to statements
write and publish a congressional report alleged to infringe upon plaintiffs' right to
privacy was barred, in part, by the separation of powers doctrine. In barring relief,
however, the McMillan court relied on two factors that distinguish the case from black-
listing suits like Hentoff. In McMillan, the report had already been published when suit
was brought, and plaintiffs' claim was said to be based upon "vague allegations of antici-
pated harm at some indefinable future time." Id. at 20. See also Cole v. McClellan, 439 F.2d
534, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Blacklists can be enjoined before publication, and the serious-
ness of the injuries suffered by the victims of blacklisting has long been recognized by
the courts. See pp. 209-10 infra. Furthermore, McMillan was probably wrongly decided.
It fails even to cite Baker or Powell on the separation of powers, and relies instead upon
Methodist Federation for Social Action v. Eastland, 141 F. Sup. 729 (D.D.C. 1956), a
case which has been severely undermined by more recent decisions of both the District
of Columbia Circuit and the Supreme Court. Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1180
(D.D.C. 1970); Doe v. MeMillan, No. 71-1027, slip op. at 36-37 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 1972)
(Wright, J., dissenting).
35. "That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought
not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament." The
Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 Win. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. 2, cited in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.
486, 502 n.20 (1969).
36. U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 6.
37. Yankivich, Immunity of Congressional Speakers, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 960, 965 (1951).
The Articles of Confederation also contained an analogous provision. ARTS. oV CoNFED.
art. V.
38. 4 Mass. 1 (1808).
39. Id. at 27.
40. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.s. 168, 203 (1881).
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made within the "power" and "role" of a Congressman.41 An activity
is said to be within the "power" of a legislator unless it is "obvious that
there was a usurpation of functions exclusively vested in the Judiciary
or-the Executive." 42 Similarly, a Congressman is acting within his pro-
tected "role" so long as he is serving the legitimate functions of the
legislature. For example, Congressmen may conduct investigations if
by so doing they serve a legitimate function, such as the collection of
information useful for the preparation of legislation, which is not ex-
clusively assigned to a coordinate branch.4 3
Three questions arise in considering whether the speech and debate
clause protects congressional blacklisting from injunction: (1) Is the
publication of blacklists a legitimate congressional function? (2) If
so, does the speech and debate clause protect Congressmen from in-
junctive relief as well as from criminal and civil sanctions for state-
ments made in such blacklists? (3) Do the agents of Congress, acting
under its authority and pursuant to its order, share the Congressmen's
immunity?
1. Blacklisting as a Congressional Function
The blacklists under consideration are those distributed in the form
of official congressional reports. 44 Such reports serve at least three im-
portant legislative purposes. First, they facilitate the passage among
Congressmen of information that may be useful for the preparation
and evaluation of legislation. Second, they provide both the executive
and judicial branches with material that might assist them in the inter-
pretation and enforcement of resulting legislation. Third, they consti-
41. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1951). There is some indication that
the place in which the expression occurs is relevant to the speech and debate protection.
Thus, a speech delivered far from Capitol Hill may be more obviously divorced from
a legislator's official role than one recited on the floor of the Senate. However, the case
law suggests that a speech or report made within the halls of Congress and otherwise
shielded by the speech and debate clause does not lose that protection simply because
an officially printed copy of it has been distributed in places far removed from Capitol
Hill. See p. 196 and note 47 infra.
42. 341 U.S. at 378.
43. McGrain v. Dougherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176-78 (1927).
44. The speech and debate immunity turns upon the form rather than the subject
matter of the challenged expression. Thus, if preparation of congressional reports gen-
erally is covered by that clause, the authors of a particular report would not lose their
immunity simply because the contents of that report are deemed libelous, violative of
the First Amendment, or otherwise illegal. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 163
(1881) (although Congress had no right to question petitioner concerning his business
affairs or to order his incarceration for failing to answer such questions, the Congressmen
involved in these activities were still held to be protected by the speech and debate clause.
because the acts of conducting investigations and voting, whatever the subject matter
of such acts, are within the power of Congressmen).
195
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tute part of the information flow to the public necessary for the evalua-
tion of its representatives and the legislation they produce.45 Recog-
nizing that the effectuation of these purposes is a legitimate legislative
function, the Supreme Court has stated in dictum that the speech and
debate clause protects legislators for their participation in the prepara-
tion of congressional reports. 40 Although lower federal courts have
indicated that the immunity would not extend to the unofficial dis-
tribution of reports by individual Congressmen,41 publication by the
Government Printing Office in response to a resolution of a House of
Congress clearly constitutes official and therefore protected publica-
tion.
2. Injunctive Relief
The nature of the immunity provided by the speech and debate
clause has never been fully defined. By its terms, the clause protects
Congressmen from being "questioned in any other Place." Courts have
long maintained that it thereby shields legislators from either criminal
prosecution or civil suit for damages based upon actions falling within
the immunity.48 However, a relatively novel question is posed by a suit
for an injunction, since the remedy sought is arguably intended to
protect the individuals affected by the disputed action, rather than to
punish legislators. This issue was confronted in Stamler v. Willis, 49
which involved suits to restrain the House Committee on Un-American
45. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1952); E. GRIFFITH, COPNCRESS, ITS
CONTEMPORARY ROLE ch . 13 (1951); J. BuRNs, CONCRESS ON TRIAL ch. VI (1949); G.
GALLowAY, CONCRESS AT THE CROSSROADS ch. 9 (1948); W. WILSON, CONRESSMIONAL GOV-
ERNMENT 303 (15th ed. 1900); Levi, Congressional Investigations, 18 U. Ctu. L. REV. 421
(1951).
46. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969). See also Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass,
1, 27 (1808); 2. T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 950 (8th ed. 1927).
47. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 936 (D. Mass. 1971), aJJ'd, 454 F.2d
(1st Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nom. Gravel v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 3385 (U.S,
Feb. 22, 1972) (private republication of material read during a Senate subcommittee
hearing is not an act protected by the speech and debate clause); Long V. Ansell,
69 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 293 U.S. 76 (1934) (the speech and debate clause does
not shield a senator from charges of libel arising out of his act of mailing excerpts
of one of his Senate speeches to some of his constituents); McGovern v. Martz, 182 F.
Supp. 343 (D.D.C. 1960) (the speech and debate clause extends to the reading of state-
ments into the Congressional Record but not to the private distribution of copies of the
Record, the former act being an "official" legislative function and therefore protected,
the latter an "unofficial" act and therefore vulnerable). Congressmen who lose the pro-
tection of the speech and debate clause because they have engaged in unofficial acts of
publication may, for that very reason, be able to claim at least the partial immunity
provided by the First Amendment. See note 24 supra.
48. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 787 (1951); Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168, 203 (1881). Cf: United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). See also L. CUsHlNG,
LAW AND PRACriCE OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLIES § 601 (2d ed. 1866).
49. 287 F. Supp. 734 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 217, remanded, 393 U.S,
407 (1968), 'subsequent decision appealed, 415 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub
nom. Ichord v. Stamler, 399 U.S. 29 (1970).
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Activities from conducting any hearings and taking any action to en-
force subpoenas served on plaintiffs, and to enjoin both the operation
of the House rule establishing the Committee and future prosecutions
for contempt of Congress. Two judges of the three-judge district court
ruled that the speech and debate clause, when applicable, forbids in-
junctive relief as absolutely as it forbids criminal and civil sanctions.
The court stated that any judicial interference with legislative debate
would constitute a proscribed "questioning" of Congressmen, so that
if congressional expression "impinges upon another's First Amend-
ment rights, the former must prevail." This opinion fostered a vig-
orous dissent, which declared that "the [speech and debate] immunity
does not extend to actions for declaratory and injunctive relief in
which, as here, Congressmen are only parties in their official capac-
ity." 51 This issue has not been decided by an appellate court: Stamler
was remanded on other groundsG2 and the Supreme Court, in Powell
v. McCormack,53 explicitly reserved judgment on the question.
54
An examination of the actual effects of an injunction suit suggests
that the original Stamler holding was correct. The Powell Court
stated:
The purpose of the protection afforded legislators [by the speech
and debate clause] is not to forestall judicial review of legislative
action but to insure that legislators are not distracted from or hin-
dered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being called
into court to defend their actions. . . . Freedom of legislative
activity and the purposes of the Speech and Debate Clause are
fully protected if legislators are relieved of the burden of defend-
ing themselves. 55
A suit for injunctive relief imposes some of the same interferences with
legislative tasks as do other court actions. If a legislator against whom
50. Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
51. Id. at 741 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
52. The Supreme Court, 393 U.S. 407 (1968). remanded for entry of a fresh de-
cree by a single-judge district court, which then dismissed the complaints against all
defendants under the speech and debate clause. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit remanded
the case as to the non-Congressmen for reconsideration in light of Powell. Although it
affirmed the dismissal as to the congressional defendants, it did so, like Powell, only
because relief against the others would provide an adequate remedy and specifically
reserved judgment on the question of whether or not the speech and debate clause bars
injunctive relief. 415 F.2d 1365, 1368 (7th Cir. 1969). No subsequent opinion in that
controversy is reported.
53. 595 U.S. 486 (1969).
54. Id. at 506 n.26. The commentators are divided on this issue. Compare Comment,
Power to Enjoin Publication by Congress of Libelous Matter, 43 IowA L. P.M; 132. 135-37
(1957), with Comment, Court Refuses to Enjoin Publication by Congress of Pamphlet
Containing Defamatory Material, 70 HARv. L. lRv. 723, 726 (1957).
55. Powell v. McCormack, 595 U.S. 486, 505 (1969).
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an injunction is sought chooses to contest the suit, he will be forced to
expend essentially the same amount of time, effort and money in the
development and presentation of a defense as he would had the relief
sought been money damages or a prison term. If, on the other hand, he
chooses to disregard the suit and the resulting injunction, he might be
subject to a proceeding for contempt, which would have the same
disruptive effects as criminal prosecutions, which are clearly banned
by the speech and debate clause. Since suits for injunctive relief pose
the very danger to the freedom of legislative activity that the clause was
designed to circumvent,56 it would seem that the clause must be inter-
preted to protect Congressmen from defending their official acts of
expression and publication in such proceedings.
S. Congressional Agents
This conclusion does not compel a further finding that the agents
of Congress are similarly immune from injunction for their roles in
publishing a congressional blacklist. On the contrary, the case law indi-
cates that they will normally not be protected by the immunity of their
principals. Since the purpose of the speech and debate clause is to pro-
tect Congressmen and not their expression per se, the decisive question
would seem to be whether court action against an agent of Congress
would interfere with a Congressman's performance of his legislative
duties.
Although the early cases agreed that the speech and debate clause
does not protect agents of Congress to the same extent that it shields
the legislators themselves, there was some ambiguity as to whether it
offered agents any protection.57 Powell v. McCormackh" indicated that
the speech and debate clause offers no protection to congressional
56. See THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967), cited with approval
in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 503 (1969), for a useful description of the role of
the speech and debate clause: "In order to enable and encourage a representative of the
publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably
necessary, that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however
powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty might occasion offense." See also United
States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966), in which it is stated that the purpose of
the speech and debate clause is "to prevent intimidation [of legislators] by the executive
and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary."
It should be noted that an injunction itself, as compared with a suit for an injunction,
causes at least as much, if not more, interference with the legislative powers since it bans
outright what a damage judgment or prison term would only seek to remedy after the fact.
57. Compare Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881) (dictum that speech and
debate clause provides no protection for congressional agents), with Dombrowski v.
Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967) and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951) (dictum
that speech and debate clause, although applicable to congressional agents, provides
them with a less absolute immunity).
58. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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agents who participate in unconstitutional or otherwise illegal activi-
ties. In holding that both declaratory and injunctive relief were avail-
able against congressional agents in order to redress the wrongful de-
nial of a congressional seat and its attendant privileges to Representa-
tive Adam Clayton Powell, the Court stated that "legislative employees
who participated in unconstitutional activity are responsible for their
acts" and are not shielded from judicial intervention by the speech
and debate clause. 59
Despite this broad ruling in Powell, two recent circuit court deci-
sions have attempted to extend the speech and debate immunity to
some congressional agents. In United States v. Doec0 the First Circuit
held that a Senator's personal legislative aides are immune from grand
jury interrogation concerning the Senator's legislative activities. This
ruling can be distinguished from blacklisting cases on at least two sep-
arate grounds. First, the Doe court accorded protection to legislative
aides because they enjoyed such a confidential relationship with their
respective Congressmen that harassment of an aide would amount to
harassment of the legislator himself, which the speech and debate
clause was designed to prevent.0 ' The agents involved in publishing
congressional reports (the Public Printer, the Superintendent of Docu-
ments, and their subordinates) do not maintain such intimate working
relationships with the Congressmen who draft those reports. Second,
the Doe case involved a grand jury investigation, while suits to enjoin
blacklists (like the suit in Powell) are civil in nature. This distinction
is significant because grand jury investigations are initiated and di-
rected by the executive branch, and therefore present a far greater
potential for coordinated and persistent harassment of legislators by an
59. Id. at 504. See also Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 US. 82 (1967), in which the
Court ruled that the Chief Counsel to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee was
not shielded by the absolute immunity of the speech and debate clause in an action
alleging violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
60. 454 F.2d - (Ist Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nor. Gravel v. United States. 40
U.S.L.W. 3385 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1972). The court held that the grand jury could not compel
Dr. Leonard Rodberg or any of Senator Gravel's other aides to testify concerning the
Senator's legislative activities during the time of their employment by Gravel. However,
other congressional agents and third parties were held to be immune only to questions
concerning their communications with the Senator or his aides directed to the Senator's
motives in carrying out his legislative activities.
61. In Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1971). the District of Columbia
Circuit relied on a similar theory in refusing to enjoin a Senate Subcommittee or its
agents from subpoenaing plaintiffs and certain documents in their possession. Although
not mentioning the speech and debate clause, the court held that judicial intervention
was inappropriate when it might create "needless friction" by halting "the ongoing
legislative process." Id. at 753. The court explicitly distinguished Hentoff on the ground
that publication only occurs after all opportunities for "legislative determination as to
the matter in controversy" are past and is thus not part of the protected legislative
process. Id. at 753 n.3.
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equal branch of government than do suits for injunction brought by
private individuals.6 2
In Doe v. McMillan,63 the District of Columbia Circuit adopted a
broad interpretation of the scope of the speech and debate clause in
denying relief against certain legislative and executive officials who
had helped to prepare and publish a congressional report alleged to
infringe upon plaintiffs' right to privacy. The court did not limit its
holding to those agents intimately involved in the legislative process, 0'
but instead ruled that "when congressional employees or officers arc
acting pursuant to valid legislative authorization, in furtherance of a
proper legislative purpose, they also come within the scope of the
Speech or Debate Clause protection."0' 0 The authorities cited do not
62. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 931, 935 (D. Mass. 1971), afi'd, 454 F.2d -
(1st Cir. 1972), cert. granted sub nor. Gravel v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 3385 (U.S.
Feb. 22, 1972). Cf. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966), in which the
Court lists "intimidation by the executive" as one of the major dangers which the speech
and debate clause was designed to prevent.
63. No. 71-1027 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 1972).
64. See note 61 supra.
65. Doe v. McMillan, No. 71-1027, slip op. at 17 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 1972). The court
actually denied relief on three separate grounds, none of which seems to support the
decision. It held that all of the named defendants were immune from suit under the
speech and debate clause, the separation of powers doctrine, and the doctrine of of-
ficial immunity.
This last doctrine is a judicially created immunity that protects government agents
from certain suits arising out of acts done in the course of their official duties. Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1959); Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
Although the immunity is absolute when applicable, the limits of its scope have not
been clearly defined. It is firmly established that this common law protection is available
only to officials under attack for their performance of discretionary rather than min-
isterial duties. David v. Cohen, 407 F.2d 1268, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1969). This distinction is
dictated by the doctrine's primary purpose, which is to free the exercise of judgment
by government agents from the inhibiting threat of court action by those whom their
decisions affect. The doctrine also appears to be limited to tort actions in which an
official is sued for monetary damages, since the immunity was designed not to shield
government officials from all judicial inquiry but only to relieve them of the inhibiting
fear that their official acts would render them personally liable for damage judgments.
See, e.g., Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. granted sub noa.
District of Columbia v. Carter, 92 S.Ct. 683 (1972). A third limitation upon the scope
of official immunity has been suggested but not settled: the doctrine may be Inapplicable
to agents of the legislative branch. See Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators
and Their Employees, 77 YALE L.J. 366, 373-75 (1967). The speech and debate clause
is a constitutional shield offering legislators and perhaps some of their agents as well
a criminal and civil immunity far broader than any enjoyed by officials of the other
two branches. It can be argued that this provision was meant to preempt the field of
legislative immunity, and that the relatively recent common law doctrine of official
immunity was merely intended to provide some similar safeguards to the constitutionally
unprotected agents of the executive and judicial branches. This interpretation is sup.
ported by dictum in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1959), which suggests that
the speech and debate clause is the legislative counterpart of executive and judicial
immunity, and by the fact that the major cases on the liability of legislative agents fall
even to discuss the possibility of a common law bar to justiciability. See, e.g., Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967). The
Supreme Court has only once been asked to decide whether or not congressional agents
enjoy a common law immunity from suit, and it sidestepped the issue by holding that
the actions in question were outside the scope of the agent's delegated authority and
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support this broad conclusion. Just before announcing its holding, the
McMillan court cites Dombrowski v. Eastland0 and Tenney v. Brand-
hove.67 Yet, as the quotation used by the court indicates, those cases
speak only of a limited immunity for legislative agents.08 Similarly, the
First Circuit decision in United States v. Doe, which McMillan cites
as direct support for its ruling, applies the clause only to a very limited
class of agents who enjoy a personal relationship of close confidence
with a Congressman. Furthermore, McMillan distinguishes Kilbourn
v. Thompson69 and Powell, the two Supreme Court cases that appear
to reject agent immunity altogether, on the ground that they dealt with
actions by agents in response to invalid authorization, while the House
District Committee's enabling resolution in the McMillan controversy
was termed "clearly valid."70 This reasoning assumes the very issue to
be decided. If the House District Committee's order to publish the
challenged report unjustifiably infringed upon plaintiffs' right to
privacy, it was as "invalid" as Congress' decision to divest Adam Clay-
ton Powell of his seat. McMillan was, therefore, decided wrongly, as
Judge J. Skelly Wright maintains in his vigorous dissent.7 ' If the
speech and debate clause offers any immunity to the agents of Congress,
it is probably limited to situations like that described in Doe, in which
certain agents are so intimately involved with the work of Congressmen
that judicial action against those agents would interfere with and intim-
thus ineligible for the official immunity shield on that narrower ground. Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963).
In view of these restrictions, the McMillan court was probably not justified in dis.
missing plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief against the agents of the Government
Printing Office on the basis of a common law immunity. Those agents were employees
of the legislative branch, an injunction does not entail financial liability, and the ac-
tivity that plaintiffs sought to enjoin-the publication of a House report-was a ministerial
task involving no discretionary policy decisions. For precisely the same three reasons,
injunctive relief against the publication of a congressional blacklist could not be barred
by the doctrine of official immunity.
The Supreme Court will soon have the opportunity to clarify some of the ambiguity
which surrounds this doctrine. In United States v. Doe. 454 F.2d - (1st Cir. 1972). cert.
granted sub nom. Gravel v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 3385 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1972), the
First Circuit relied primarily upon the speech and debate clause to shield Senator Gravel
and his aides from grand jury interrogation, but it suggested that under certain circum-
stances, those officials might enjoy a common law immunity as well. The Supreme
Court has specifically included the issue of official immunity for legislative agents among
the questions it will consider in its review of Doe. 40 U.S.L.W. at 3385. However, even
if the Court should decide that the doctrine applies to employees of the legislative
branch threatened by grand jury questioning concerning their official duties, thereby
greatly expanding that immunity, the ministerial task of printing blacklists should
still be beyond its scope.
66. 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
67. 341 US. 367 (1951).
68. See note 57 supra.
69. 103 US. 168 (1881).
70. Doe v. McMillan, No. 71-1027, slip op. at 17 n.17 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 1972).
71. Id. at 29-47.
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idate the Congressmen themselves. Such an immunity would seem not
to extend to members of the Government Printing Office involved
solely in the physical reproduction of a document after completion of
all legislative deliberation as to its contents.
1 2
C. The Journal of Proceedings Clause
Another possible restriction on judicial interference with legislative
publication, which was not raised by the defendants in Hentoff and
McMillan, is the constitutional mandate that "Each House shall keep
a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same,
excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy."70
Given this affirmative obligation to publish a record of congressional
operations and its apparent policy of insuring public knowledge about
the legislature's activities, 4 it could be argued that the judiciary is
powerless to interfere with the publication and dissemination of any
congressional document.
This argument, however, sweeps too broadly. First, a congressional
report is probably not a "Journal of... Proceedings" within the mean-
ing of this clause. Unlike the Congressional Record or a transcript of
a committee hearing,75 a report is not a record of a congressional "pro-
ceeding" but rather a statement of findings of fact, opinions, and recom-
mendations.70 More importantly, reports are normally drafted by com-
mittees and subcommittees, while the journal clause is generally con-
sidered applicable only to records of the proceedings of each House
meeting as a whole.77 In fact, the Court has specifically stated that each
House may at its discretion decide whether or not to place the full text
72. Although these officials would be protected by neither the speech and debate
clause nor the First Amendment, see note 24 supra, for their acts as agents of Congress,
they might still be immune from suit for damages to the extent that any of their decisions
are discretionary in nature, under the doctrine of official immunity. See note 65 supra.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
74. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670-71 (1892), quoting 1 J. SToRY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 840, 841 (1873), to the effect that the
purpose of that clause is "to ensure publicity to proceedings of the legislature, and a
correspondent responsibility of the members to their respective constituents." See also
Hennings, The Peoples Right to Know, 45 A.B.A.J. 667, 669 (1959).
75. See Note, A Defendant's Right to Inspect Pretrial Congressional Testimony of
Government Witnesses, 80 YALE L.J. 1388, 1406 (1971).
76. See T. NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS SOURCES AND ITS
APPLICATION 28 (1966), in which the author implies that the printing of "every word
uttered in the House and in the Senate" satisfies the requirement of the journal clause.
77. Corwin states that even the proceedings of a House meeting as a whole need not
fall within the journal clause if it meets as a "committee of the whole" rather than
as a normal plenary session. E, CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WIIAT IT MEANS TODAY
18 (1963). But see Note, supra note 75, at 1406.
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of a report into its required journal of proceedings,78 which implies
both that reports published separately do not themselves constitute
such journals and that the publication of all reports is not deemed
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the journal clause.
Furthermore, the provision's primary purpose of insuring public
knowledge would seem fully satisfied by the preservation of one com-
plete record of congressional activities. As long as publication of the
Congressional Record is protected and Congressmen have access to the
Record for the purpose of including material other than floor de-
bates,79 the constitutional purpose will be fully achieved even if other
forms of publication are enjoined.80 It is not surprising, therefore, that
every case which has dealt with the journal clause has done so solely in
the context of the Congressional Record,8 and that the commentators
have assumed that publication of the Record satisfies the mandate of
that provision.82
Second, it does not follow from the fact that Congress has a duty to
publish a journal that its power to do so is never subject to limitation.
All powers granted to Congress by Article I of the Constitution are
subject to the limitations imposed by the First Amendment and other
restrictive provisions. The power to publish is no different because of
its apparently mandatory nature ("Each House shall keep a Journal")
-the First Amendment, after all, is also obligatory: "Congress shall
78. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 671 (1892):
[I]t is clear that, in respect to the particular mode in which, or with what fulness,
shall be kept the proceedings of either house relating to matters not expressly re-
quired to be entered on the journals; whether bills, orders, resolutions, reports and
amendments shall be entered at large on the journal, or only referred to and desig-
nated by their titles or by numbers; these and like matters were left to the discretion
of the respective houses of Congress (emphasis added).
79. A Congressman has the right, subject to the unanimous consent of his House.
to place materials, including congressional reports, into the Congressional Record. See
L. DEscHILER, CONsrrruTioN, JEFFERsON's MANUAL, AND RuLEs OF THE HOUSE OF RE=tE-
SENTAATIVES § 929 (1971); L. SCHIECKMIER & R. EAsriN, GovEriaEN-r PunuroNs AND
THEIR UsE 140-44 (2d ed. 1969).
80. Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1180-81 (D.D.C. 1970). The court concluded
that the independent publication of a House report was not required by the journal
of proceedings clause.
81. United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (189.):
Provost v. Morgenthau, 106 F.2d 330, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1939). Other cases which mentioned
the clause in passing did not attempt to define the nature of the "Journal of Proceed-
ings.' Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220
U.S. 107, 143 (1913).
Actually, the journal clause technically applies only to the official Journals of both
Houses, which together contain the daily proceedings in Congress and which, subject
to amendment, are printed as the main sections of the Congressional Record. See L.
DEscHILER, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, AND RULEs OF im HOUSE OF REP iESENTA-
ElvEs 26 (1969).
82. See T. NORTON, supra note 76, at 28; 1 B. ScuwARTZ, A Co~smserArv ON TtE
CONsrrrumON OF THE UNrrED STATES 108 (1963).
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make no law ... ."83 Moreover, the power to publish a journal is in fact
somewhat discretionary. The journal clause explicitly authorizes each
House to exclude any information deemed to require secrecy (an au-
thority which, though normally used to cloak matters of national se-
curity, was recently used to protect an individual's constitutional
rights8 4), and the Court has stated that the inclusion of materials other
than plenary proceedings (such as reports) is left to the discretion of
Congress.8 5 Finally, the journal is not protected from judicial interfer-
ence simply because the journal clause assigns decisions regarding its
contents to the judgment of the relevant House of Congress. The Court
has held that the rules of each House" and the qualifications of its
membership, 7 two other issues as to which Article I, Section 5 ex-
plicitly calls for congressional judgment, are nonetheless subject to
judicial scrutiny when they affect individual rights.
Even if, as seems probable, congressional reports do not form part
of the mandated "journal of proceedings," the power of courts to en-
join publication of that journal would become a critical issue should
a committee or an individual Congressman seek to circumvent an in-
junction against the publication of a report by placing the text of that
report into the Congressional Record.8 As noted above, the journal
clause does not per se prohibit judicial action against the Congressional
Record, and the purpose of that provision-to prevent the legislature
from holding secret proceedings-would not seem thwarted by an oc-
casional judicial excision from the Record of materials whose publica-
tion is discretionary,89 when publication would seriously jeopardize
individual rights.90
II. The Constitutionality of Congressional Blacklisting
The analysis thus far indicates that the general agents of Congress
can be enjoined from publishing a congressional report, either sep-
83. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
84. See Note, supra note 75, at 1406. A House subcommittee investigating the My
Lai incident decided to keep secret testimony given during the inquiry on the ground
that its public release might prejudice the parties in upcoming criminal cases.
85. See note 78 supra.
86. United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932); United States v. Balltn, 144 U.S. 1,
5 (1892).
87. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
88. The Record probably enjoys at least as large a circulation as do reports printed
separately by the Government Printing Office.
89. See note 78 supra.
90. But see Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1179, 1180 (D.D.C. 1970). Although
plaintiffs explicitly did not request such relief, the Hentoji court stated in dicta that the
Congressional Record could not be enjoined, and seemed to base that conclusion upon
both the journal of proceedings and the speech and debate clauses.
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arately or possibly even in the Congressional Record, if such publica-
tion were found to violate the Constitution. It is thus necessary to con-
front the second and potentially more important question posed by
the Hentoff case: Is the publication of a congressional blacklist an un-
constitutional act? Two separate lines of attack will be examined: first,
that a congressional blacklist constitutes a bill of attainder; and second,
that it constitutes a violation of the blacklist victims' First Amendment
freedoms of expression and association.
A. The Bill of Attainder Claim
The constitutional bar against bills of attainder"' is based upon two
old English counterparts, which prohibited extrajudicial trial and pun-
ishment at the hands of Parliament. 2 Its basic purpose is to maintain
the separation of governmental powers by preventing usurpation of
the judicial function through individualized, deprivational classifica-
tions made by legislatures. 93 The classic bill of attainder may be de-
scribed as a legislative enactment naming an individual, reciting cer-
tain "crimes" committed by him (for which no judicial proceedings
had been initiated), declaring him to be guilty of those crimes, and
ordering that he be punished through the deprivation of life, liberty
or property.9 Although the bill of attainder clause has rarely been
used by the Supreme Court to invalidate a law,95 the decisions and
91. The Constitution actually contains two provisions prohibiting bills of attainder.
one addressing itself to Congress, US. CONsr. art. I, § 9, c. 3; and the other to the state
legislatures, U.S. CONS. art. I, § 10, cL 1. Since the cases do not stress this distinction
and seem to assume that both provisions should be interpreted identically, the term
"bill of attainder clause" will be used in this Note to refer to both provisions, although
it should be understood that congressional blacklisting is subject to attack only under
the prohibition in Section 9.
92. The American bill of attainder clause actually had its origin in two separate
English legal forms: the Bill of Attainder and the Bill of Pains and Penalties. The
former was used only to inflict the death sentence; the latter for lesser penalties. In
both cases, the term was applied to parliamentary trial and punishment of specified
individuals without recourse to formal judicial proceedings or the attendant rights of
the accused. Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause and Legislative and Administrative
Suppression of "Subversives," 67 COLU.%t. L. REV. 1490, 1492 (1967).
93. Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill
of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 333 (1962).
94. For a similar model, see Note, supra note 92, at 1491.
95. United States v. Brown, 381 US. 437 (1965) (a federal law making it a crime for
anyone who was or had been during the prior five years a member of the Communist
Party to accept an office or employment in a labor union); United States v. Lovctt,
528 U.S. 303 (1946) (a federal statute barring payment of salaries to three named gov-
ernment employees suspected of subversion); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234
(1872) (a West Virginia statute allowing civil judgment and attachment without either
personal service upon or personal appearance by the adverse party); Ex parte Garland.71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (a federal statute providing that no one shall be admitted
to the bar of the United States Supreme Court without swearing that he has never
supported an authority hostile to the United States government); Cummings v. Missouri.
71 US. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (a state constitutional amendment requiring cergy to take
an oath that they had never committed acts in support of the Confederacy).
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dicta of the Supreme Court as well as the clause's essential purpose in-
dicate that it applies to a much broader group of congressional acts
than are encompassed by this narrow, classic model of attainder.90
1. The Dimensions of the Bill of Attainder Prohibition
First, although all three congressional acts that have thus far been
voided under the bill of attainder clause were statutes,0 7 the provision
should also be read to encompass other products of the legislative
process preparatory or ancillary to the enactment of laws. The bill of
attainder cases speak in terms of "legislative acts" rather than specific-
ally limiting the scope of the clause to statutes, 8 and the Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of effect over form:
[T]he Bill of Attainder Clause was intended not as a narrow, tech-
nical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition, but
rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a gen-
eral safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial function,
or more simply-trial by legislature.09
Since a congressional report can produce as much harm as a statutory
enactment, 00 and since both can usurp the judicial function by con-
demning individuals on the basis of a legislative finding rather than
a court judgment, a congressional report should be considered a "legis-
lative act" subject to the bill of attainder prohibition. 01
The fact that reports are technically the products of committee ac-
96. But see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 321-24 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., con.
curring). Justice Frankfurter suggested that a bill of attainder must include (1) specific
naming, (2) a listing of bad acts, (3) a recital of guilt, and (4) the deprivation of a vested
right which cannot be avoided by a change of conduct on the part of those so named.
Frankfurter's definition, however, has never been accepted by the Court.
97. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S, 303
(1946); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). The Court has also invalidated
two state enactments: a statute, Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872) and
a state constitutional amendment, Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
See note 95 supra.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866). In fact, the act invalidated in Cummings was a coil
stitutional amendment, not a statute.
99. United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). See also p. 208 infia.
100. See pp. 209-10 infra.
101. James Madison apparently believed that the bill of attainder prohibition applied
to anything entailing a congressional vote. In November of 1794, he opposed a resolution
introduced in Congress, which expressed public disapproval of certain "self-created
Democratic societies," on the ground that "[ilt is vain to say that this indiscrintinant
censure is no punishment. If it falls on classes, or individuals, it will be a severe punish.
ment. . . . Is not this proposition, if voted, a vote of attainder?" 4 ANNALS OF CoM4.
934 (1794), cited in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
144 n.1 (1951) (Black, J., concurring).
206
Vol. 81: 188, 1971
Blacklisting and Publication of Congressional Reports
tion rather than acts of the legislature as a whole should not bar relief.
First, a committee is a creature of Congress, having no independent
constitutional existence and owing all of its authority to the delegated
legislative power of Congress as a whole. H.R. 91-1732, for instance,
was prepared pursuant to explicit statutory authorization empower-
ing the House Internal Security Committee to investigate subversive
activities and to report about them.102 It seems inconceivable that Con-
gress could grant its constituent bodies a power to attaint individuals
which Congress itself lacks.103 Indeed, two Supreme Court Justices have
concluded that even certain acts of administrative bodies constitute
bills of attainder, 04 despite the fact that courts have held valid the
delegation of quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies.1°5
Second, although reports are usually written by committees or subcom-
mittees, they can only be published upon order of either House, and
the power to publish is itself delegated to the individual Houses by an
Act of Congress.10 6 This process is not significantly distinguishable
from the enactment of statutes, which are often written substantially
in committee and formally approved by both Houses. Thus, neither
the nature of the act nor its source would preclude application of the
bill of attainder prohibition to congressional reports.
The classic model's requirement of specificity is also narrower than
existing law, for a bill of attainder need not actually name the persons
to be punished. Although frequently used to punish specifically named
individuals, the early English acts of attainder occasionally inflicted
harm on large groups of people, designating them only by the name of
their organization or simply by general description.10 7 The Supreme
Court adopted this broad approach in three post-Civil War cases, in
which punishment was inflicted on citizens described only as parties
to a civil suit or as men unwilling to swear that they had not been
102. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, tit. 1, 60 Stat. 828 (1946). This
authorization, which originally applied to the House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities, has been made applicable to that committee's successor, the House Internal
Security Committee. See note 6 supra.
103. Note, supra note 92, at 1500-02.
104. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 352 (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring) (decision
of Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board to bar petitioner from federal
service for three years upon an administrative finding of doubtful loyalty violates the
bill of attainder clause); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 460 (1954) (Black. J.,
dissenting); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 144 (1931)
(Black, J., concurring). In the last two opinions, Justice Black concluded that the Atorney
General's list of subversive organizations violated the bill of attainder clause.
105. See K. DAvis, ADMnPinRATiVE LAW § 18 (1951).
106. 44 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
107. See acts cited in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437. 461 n.37 (1965).
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loyal to the Confederacy.10 In a more recent case, the Court stated
that
legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to
named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group
in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial
trial are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution."00
That this broad statement should have been made in an attainder case
in which the challenged act actually specified its victims by name 10
indicates the Court's awareness that the clause was designed to prevent
subtle as well as direct legislative specification.
The classic requirements of formality in punishment-a listing of
bad acts and a recital of guilt-have also been relaxed. In two of the
Civil War cases, the Court explicitly held that a recital of guilt is not
a necessary element of bills of attainder,'11 and the statute voided in
United States v. Brown" 2 did not list any bad acts that all members of
the Communist Party had committed.
The cases also have outlined a much broader concept of the punish-
ment needed to establish a bill of attainder than the classic model sug-
gests. As early as 1866, the Court, in Cummings v. Missouri,1" 8 stated
that "[t]he deprivation of any rights, civil or political, previously en-
joyed, may be punishment, the circumstances attending and the causes
of the deprivation determining this fact." 14 As that decision explained,
this broad definition of harm encompasses intangible as well as ma-
terial deprivations:
We do not agree with the counsel of Missouri that 'to punish one
is to deprive him of life, liberty, or property, and that to take any-
thing less than these is no punishment at all.' The learned counsel
does not use these terms--life, liberty, and property-as compre-
hending every right known to the law. He does not include under
liberty freedom from outrage on the feelings as well as restraints
on the person. He does not include under property those estates
108. Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
109. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946) (emphasis added).
110. See note 95 supra.
111. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
112. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
113. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866).
114. Id. at 320. The actual "punishment" inflicted by the law under review in
Cummings consisted in a limitation of the types of employment available to those un-
willing to take the required loyalty oath.
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which one may acquire in professions, though they are often the
sources of the highest emoluments and honors.""a
There can be little doubt that blacklisting of the type exhibited by
H.R. 91-1732 can cause irreparable injury to its victims, including
damage to person and property as well as to the intangibles of reputa-
tion and esteem described in Cummings. This injury can take essen-
tially three forms: deprivation, personal intimidation, and intimida-
tion of those whom the blacklist victim hopes to recruit to his group
or cause.
The deprivational threat inherent in blacklisting derives from tie
likelihood of public reaction against those whom the government offi-
cially brands with unpopular labels. The danger of private sanctions
against individuals exposed as non-conformists was recognized by de
Tocqueville more than a century agoI 11 but the full power of collec-
tive intolerance has been revealed only recently with the advent of
effective mass communications. 17 Such private sanctions can be as
harmful as judicial punishment; as one commentary notes, "[]oss of a
job... may entail greater economic deprivation than a fine. And isola-
tion within society (ostracism) is not wholly unlike isolation from
society (imprisonment).,,x1s
Unjustified disclosure of damaging information has also been con-
demned because of its "chilling effect" on the future exercise of First
115. Id.
116. A. DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN A.MERICA 264 (P. Bradley ed. 1957). As perceptive
as de Tocqueville was, he seems to have overlooked two aspects of this problem which
are of particular importance to an examination of blacklisting. First, although de Tocque-
ville's democratic "master" allows the dissenter to retain his life and property, the
McCarthy era revealed that those who wield public and private influence might not
be so kind. See note 118 infra. Second, it should be noted that his "master" is actually
a personification of the American "majority." That characterization is incomplete, how-
ever, without mention of the role that a relatively small number of influential people
may play in shaping and focusing the opinions of that majority. A blacklist exhibiting
what appears to be official government endorsement would carry with it enhanced au-
thority as it both interacted with and shaped public opinion. The danger presented by
official condemnation of private individuals is emphasized in Finman & Macaulay, Free-
dom to Dissent: The Vietnam Protests and the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIs. L.
REv. 632, 679.
117. The effect of government condemnation in today's world of instantaneous na-
tionwide communications is illustrated by the following incident. On March 5, 1966,
newspapers carried the story that the United States Attorney General had decided to
institute legal proceedings to force the W.E.B. Du Bois Club to register as a communist
organization. Within twenty-four hours, club members were beaten in Brooklyn and
the club's San Francisco headquarters was bombed. Finman & Macaulay, supra note 116,
at 633, citing N.Y. Times, March 5, 1966, §l, at 1, cols. 6-7 and 4, cols. 3.5; N.Y. Times,
March 6, 1966, § 2, at 53, col. 1.
118. Finman & Macaulay, supra note 116, at 694. Sec also Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 142 (1951) (Black, J., concurring); Note, supra note 92,
at 1506-08.
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Amendment freedoms. 110 This effect is manifested in two separate
ways. The victims of such disclosure may be reluctant to maintain
those affiliations or repeat those statements that led to their exposure
and public condemnation. Furthermore, those who are willing to con-
tinue to exercise their rights may find themselves unable to gain re-
cruits for their cause, because government exposure has frightened
away many who might otherwise have joined them.
120
Although it is clear that individuals listed in blacklists may be seri-
ously harmed by the government's decision to publish such documents,
the question remains whether such harm constitutes "punishment"
within the ambit of the bill of attainder clause. Unlike the legislative
acts thus far declared bills of attainder, all of which entailed direct
governmental deprivations, the harm suffered by the victims of black-
listing results from the imposition of private sanctions indirectly en-
couraged by the government's decision to publish the blacklist.
An extension of the Cummings definition of punishment 21 to en-
compass such indirect deprivation is suggested by the Supreme Court
decision in NAACP v. Alabama. 22 In that case, the court held
that the government could not compel exposure of the membership
lists of an unpopular organization because it would encourage private
sanctions against individuals who had exercised their freedom of ex-
pression and association. 23 Since the mere act of exposing individual
names can constitute government deprivation of First Amendment
freedoms, and since Cummings stated that "any deprivation or suspen-
sion of any... [inalienable] rights for past conduct is punishment, and
can be in no otherwise defined,"'1 4 it would seem that the injuries
119. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (reversing convictions of the NAACP
for failing to comply with an occupational license tax ordinance requiring the produc.
tion of local branch membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 US. 449 (1958) (reversing
a contempt conviction against the NAACP for failure to produce membership lists);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (limiting Congress' power to compel the
disclosure of information during congressional invcstigations). See Dombrowski v. 'fister,
380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965), in which Justice Brennan coined the term "chilling effect" In
an opinion that granted federal injunctive relief to plaintiffs who alleged that they
would be irreparably injured by harassment and prosecution under an unconstitutional
state statute.
120. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958), in which the Court concluded
that disclosure of the membership lists of the NAACP's local branches was
likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their
collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate,
in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade
others from joining it ....
121. See pp. 208-09 supra.
122. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
123. Id. at 462-63.
124. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 322 (1866).
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peculiar to blacklisting satisfy the bill of attainder requirement of
"punishment."12 5 This conclusion is consistent with the basic purpose
of the bill of attainder clause-to prevent deprivations of any kind by
legislative action enumerating the individuals to be affected? -12
Many blacklists would fall within these broad criteria regarding the
specificity of target and the nature and formality of punishment. How-
ever, the Supreme Court has not yet created a single, clear definition
of attainder encompassing all these criteria, nor have the cases in which
legislative acts were held invalid as bills of attainder forced the Court
to test the outer limits of this broader model. It seems clear that not all
legislative acts that refer in general terms to identifiable groups of in-
dividuals and prescribe actions which injure them are bills of attainder
-if that were so, a great deal of regulatory legislation would be in-
valid.'2 7 For present purposes, however, the limits on specification are
irrelevant-the documents under consideration in this Note are those
that either list the actual names of the individuals or organizations
attacked or identify them with at least the particularity banned in
Brown. s28 Potential limits on the attenuated concept of punishment,
though, are significant in relation to blacklists.
One consideration that might make courts reluctant to extend the
concept of punishment to include deprivations resulting from govern-
ment publication is the desire to preserve the right of critical comment
about public figures, which underwent a sweeping expansion during
the same period that saw the expansion of the bill of attainder prohibi-
tion under Brown. 2 9 If courts were to extend the bill of attainder
clause to encompass congressional blacklisting, they would sacrifice
some of the unique contributions that Congress, utilizing sources avail-
able to it alone, can make to the general debate on public issues and
leaders. On the other hand, the very fact that Congress possesses special
125. Private sanctions appear to have been the crucial factor in justice Black's con-
clusion that the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations entailed sufficient
government "punishment" to constitute a bill of attainder. See note I04 supra. James
Madison also appears to have envisioned the bill of attainder clause as prohibiting
legislative censure of specified individuals. See note 101 supra. Bills of attainder utilizing
indirect punishment can also be found in early English law. A statute enacted in the
fourteenth century, for example, proclaimed of an attainted person, "he that should
bring his head should have 500 1. of the King's Gift." See Note, supra note 92, at 1511.
126. See p. 205 and note 93 supra.
127. A regulatory statute explicitly aimed at the nation's strip miners, for instance,
might detrimentally affect a small, easily ascertainable group, but it would probably
not constitute a bill of attainder.
128. The statute held invalid in Brown identified its target as any person who is
or was during the prior five years a member of the Communist Party. 381 U.S. 437, 438
n.1 (1965).
129. See note 24 supra.
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advantages in the marketing of opinion-including extraordinary pres-
tige, access to secret government information, use of the subpoena
power, and the absence of effective competition-would seem to justify
the imposition of limitations not placed upon the publishing power of
private sources of expression. Furthermore, many of the policies that
underlie the public comment cases-concern for the rights of indi-
viduals to speak out freely on matters of public interest and to petition
government for the redress of grievances-do not apply when the
source of expression is the lawmaking branch of government. More-
over, Congress and its members are shielded by special constitutional
protections not available to any other public speaker.'30 These con-
siderations suggest that the recent narrowing of common law restric-
tions on an individual's right of expression should not deter acceptance
of a concept of attainder broad enough to encompass congressional
blacklisting.
2. The Element of Intent
The discussion so far has concerned documents that are in effect
bills of attainder and has ignored the possibility that to be constitu-
tionally defective a legislative act must also be motivated by an intent
to punish. For many years, this issue was resolved by reference to a
series of cases upholding state qualifications for employment, which
held that only the clearest proof of an intent to punish would suffice
to invalidate a statute as a bill of attainder, and even that would be
insufficient if the government could justify its actions in terms of goals
other than punishment.1
3 1
These strict requirements have been modified by the more recent
case of United States v. Brown.18 2 In that case, the government argued
that a law barring recent members of the Communist Party from serv-
ing on the executive board of a labor organization was not intended
as punishment of the Communist Party or its membership, but rather
130. E.g., the speech and debate clause (Article I, Section 6), the right to publish a
journal of proceedings (Article I, Section 5), and the separation of powers doctrine. See
note 24 supra.
131. De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960) (law forbidding those convicted of
a felony to hold office in a waterfront labor union); Garner v. Los Angeles Bd., 341
U.S. 716, 722-23 (1951) (law barring from city office anyone who, within the last five
years, had advocated the forceful overthrow of the state or federal government or had
belonged to an organization that did so); Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (law
making it a misdemeanor for anyone to practice medicine after having been convicted
of a felony). See also Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (provisions of the
Social Security Act disqualifying selected groups for old-age benefits).
132. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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as a reasonable occupational regulation serving the legitimate interest
of national security. The Court did not accept this rationale:
It would be archaic to limit the definition of 'punishment' to
'retribution.' Punishment serves several purposes: retributive, re-
habilitative, deterrent-and preventive. One of the reasons so-
ciety imprisons those convicted of crimes is to keep them from
inflicting future harm, but that does not make imprisonment any
the less punishment.133
Despite this broad definition of "punishment," the Brown Court ap-
parently did not dispense altogether with intent and institute a pure
effect test. Since Brown involved a criminal statute, a legislative act
that on its face demonstrates an intention to deprive, the Court did
not consider whether such an intent is a separate requirement of
"punishment" under the bill of attainder clause. That issue is raised,
however, by a congressional blacklist, which arguably may have been
drafted solely for informational purposes, relegating the resulting dep-
rivation of the right of expression to the status of an incidental and
unintended side effect of publication.
Although it did not dispense altogether with an intent requirement,
the Brown decision undeniably points in the direction of a pure effect
standard. It describes the bill of attainder clause as a flexible prohibi-
tion designed to bar legislative acts which in fact, though not neces-
sarily in form, usurp the judicial function.13 4 Furthermore, it so
greatly broadens the definition of punitive purposes as to arguably
render any deprivational legislative act a bill of attainder. Elimination
of the requirement that the deprivation be deliberate, moreover, would
comport with a sound construction of the bill of attainder clause.
The prohibition against bills of attainder is directed primarily at the
vice of explicit specification of the individuals to be affected by legis-
lation.135 It would seem unreasonable to permit Congress to circumvent
this policy simply by presenting purported non-deprivational purposes
for the publication of a blacklist.
This line of argument suggests that congressional blacklists in gen-
eral-and H.R. 91-1732 in particular-are unconstitutional bills of
attainder. Such documents specify certain individuals or organizations,
accuse them of illegal or at least generally disapproved behavior, and
133. Id. at 458.
134. Id. at 442.
135. See p. 205 and note 93 supra.
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regardless of deprivational intent, have the effect of punishing the
specified persons by encouraging private hostility and retribution.Y' 0
B. The First Amendment Claim
Since the harm flowing from congressional blacklisting is a result of
hostility to certain political beliefs and affiliations, persons named in
such documents naturally look to the First Amendment for protection.
Although it is thought to enjoy a "preferred position" among con-
stitutional provisions, 137 the First Amendment does not provide an ab-
solute bar against infringements upon freedom of speech incidental
to government regulation of matters unrelated to expression. 18 To be
successful, a First Amendment challenge to congressional blacklisting
must establish (1) that the blacklist threatens the persons named with
serious harm of a nature proscribed by the First Amendment, and (2)
that such injury is not justified by legitimate government functions.
1. The Impact of Congressional Blacklisting on First Amendment
Rights
0
The types of injuries suffered by those named in blacklists--public
hostility, loss of employment, and sometimes even personal injury and
property damage-as well as the resultant "chilling effect" on the
future exercise of rights of expression and of association have already
been described. 139 In response to these dangers, the Supreme Court
has held that the government's role in instigating such injuries through
disclosure of information constitutes sufficient state action to create
136. If, however, courts demand that an intent to inflict deprivation be proved, such
a requirement might still be satisfied by reference to the wording, legislative history,
and supporting speeches of a particular blacklist. See pp. 220-23 infra. Cf. Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 170-86 (1963), in which examination of those factors
led the Court to conclude that a law depriving a certain class of people of their citizen.
ship was punitive in nature. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 n.30
(1968), which indicates that an analysis of motivation may be proper in a bill of attainder
case and should not be deterred by judicial reluctance to examine motivation in other
areas of the law.
137. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) and cases
cited in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90-94 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring),
138. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); Watkins v. United States, 354
U.S. 178, 198 (1957).
The First Amendment protects individuals against infringements on their rights of
expression by "lawmaking" as well as by "laws." Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178,
197 (1957). Like congressional investigations at issue in Watkins, congressional reports
issued pursuant to such an inquiry and designed to facilitate drafting and evaluation of
legislation is part of the "lawmaking" subject to the First Amendment's prohibitions.
139. See pp. 209-10 supra.
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an impermissible deprivation of First Amendment freedoms, even
though the harm is directly imposed only by private individuals.140
Although most of the cases have involved forced disclosure by the
injured individual of damaging information, the language and policy
concerns of those opinions would appear to forbid indirect infringe-
ment of individual rights through government disclosure of unfavor-
able information regardless of its source. The cases place emphasis not
upon state coercion, but upon the interplay between state action and
private reaction. Moreover, the primary focus has been the protection
of the freedoms of expression and association, which are threatened by
the mere disclosure of harmful information, rather than the right
against self-incrimination, which is threatened by forced extraction of
information. Thus, it would appear that even blacklists compiled solely
on the basis of voluntarily disclosed or public information infringe on
the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and association.
Although disclosure of this type infringes upon First Amendment
rights, proof of infringement will not alone establish its unconstitu-
tionality. Indeed, courts will generally uphold those official actions
that serve legitimate and important governmental functions.1 4' Those
faced with such a claimed justification can pursue two lines of attack.
First, an act can be challenged on the ground that it was motivated by
a desire to further impermissible governmental purposes. Second, the
legitimacy of the goals can be conceded and the act attacked because
there exist alternative means of serving the government's legitimate
interests which impose less drastic restrictions on individual rights.
These two arguments will be considered in turn to determine the First
Amendment limitations on congressional blacklisting.
2. Legislative Motivation
The Supreme Court has shown a strong aversion to examining legis-
lative motivation, stemming from three difficulties inherent in sud
an undertaking. 4- First, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the mo-
140. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Wallace v. Brewer, 315 F. Supp. 431
(I.D. Ala. 1970) (voiding an Alabama statute requiring that all Muslim organizations
register with and supply membership lists to the Alabama Department of Public Safct)).
141. See note 158 supra.
142. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YAE
L.J. 1205, 1212-17 (1970). See also Palmer v. Thompson. 403 U.S. 217. 224-25 (1971);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968). The terms "bad," "illicit, and "ille-
gitimate" motivation will be used interchangeably to describe constitutionally impermis-
sible purposes.
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tivation behind a particular congressional act, if indeed it even makes
sense to speak of discrete motives when dealing with a large number
of individual legislators, each of whom may have a variety of different
reasons for supporting a particular act. Since the respect owed a coor-
dinate branch of government requires that a congressional act only be
overturned upon a substantial showing of illegality,14 the Court is and
should be most reluctant to void such an act upon the usually am-
biguous proof of bad motivation. Second, an act which has been found
unconstitutional on the grounds of illicit motivation can be repeated
with impunity if the legislators are simply more careful the second
time to avoid statements suggesting such impropriety. This considera-
tion is particularly important in injunction suits in light of the judicial
policy against futile judgments by a court in equity.144 Third, it can be
argued that an act that is otherwise unobjectionable should not be
invalidated solely because of the objectionable statements and mo.
tives of a few of its supporters.145
The Supreme Court's policy towards examination of legislative mo-
tivation prompted by these concerns is revealed in two separate lines
of precedent. In cases challenging legislative investigations as improp.
erly motivated, the Court has repeatedly held that illegitimate motiva-
tion will not alone vitiate an investigation that serves legitimate pur-
poses. 146 Yet, it has not ruled out entirely analysis of motivation in
such cases, insisting that a legislature is without authority to "expose
for the sake of exposure."1 47 This suggests that proof of illicit mo-
tivation would be sufficient to invalidate an investigation at least in
cases where no legitimate explanation was presented. The Court, how-
143. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 128 (1810).
144. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 744 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); Z. CHAFEE & E. RE, EQUITY 935-54 (5th ed. 1967); 1 H. JOYCE, INJUNcrIONS
§§ 58-60a (1909).
145. But see Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconsti.
tutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. RaV. 95, 115-31 (1971), in which the author
balances the arguments for and against the judicial examination of motivation and
concludes that "[a] court should entertain an action challenging an otherwise constitu.
tional decision . . . on the ground that it was designed in part to serve an illicit or
suspect objective." Id. at 130.
146. Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); Braden v. United Stateg, 365
U.S: 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
147. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957). See also Hutcheson v. United
States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962), in which the Court upheld a Senate Committee's right to
investigate certain activities on the grounds that such inquiry was within the scope of
Congress' legitimate functions and because "the record is barren of evidence indicating
that the Committee, for reasons of its own, undertook to 'expose' this petitioner," Id,
at 617.
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ever, has never held a legislative inquiry invalid on the basis of this
"exposure" principle.""8
In considering motivation attacks on legislative enactments, the
Court has established a general rule against examination of legislative
motivation. In United States v. O'Brien,1 40 a challenge to a Selective
Service law amendment prohibiting the destruction of draft cards on
the ground that Congress enacted it in order to stifle anti-war dissent,
the Court explicitly declined to examine motivation and instead pro-
mulgated the following rule:
A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the
constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an impor-
tant or substantial government interest; if the government interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.1 50
At least in cases not involving the establishment of religion clause,151
the Court claims that it has always adhered to this strict effect test.0 2
However, at least three earlier cases cannot be easily harmonized with
this rule. In Grosjean v. American Press Co.,S3 voiding a tax on news-
148. In DeGregory v. Attorney General, 385 U.S. 825 (1966), the Court declared un-
constitutional the forced extraction of information about communist affiliations by the
New Hampshire Attorney General on the ground that the state had failed to prove
that it was in any real danger of subversion. The Court purported to avoid the moti-
vation issue by finding that the inquiry was not justified by any "compelling state
interest." Id. at 830.
Other legislative investigations have been declared unconstitutional because their in-
terrogations exceeded the scope of inquiry established by a parent body, Sacher v. United
States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958); United States v. Rumel,, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); cf. Sezy" V.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); or by its own official statement of intention. Gojack
v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); Deutsch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); Scull
v. Virginia, 359 US. 344 (1959).
149. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
150. Id. at 377. The last criterion is essentially a restatement of the "less drastic
means" test discussed at pp. 223-25 infra.
151. Although the Court has never said that religion cases constitute a special excep-
tion to the bar against examining motivation, it is difficult to construe these cases oth-
er-wise. In Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), in overturning
a Pennsylvania statute that required the reading of passages from the Bible in public
schools, the Court established the rule that if a law's "purpose" or "primary effect" is
to advance religion, that law is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. In 1963,
immediately after O'Brien, the Court twice again examined motivation in religion cases
-Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1969)-
and in the latter case invalidated the statute solely on the ground that it was motivated
by a pro-religion animus. One can conclude only that the Court is willing to consider
motivation in cases dealing with one section of the First Amendment (establishment of
religion) but not in cases dealing with another section (freedom of speech), although
the reason for this distinction remains unexplained and, one suspects, is inexplicable.
152. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 384-85 (1968).
153. 297 U.S. 233 (1936). The Court found that the tax had "the plain purpose of
penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of news-
papers," in violation of their First Amendment freedom of the press. Id. at 251.
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papers with a circulation of over 200,000 copies per week, Gomillion
v. Lightfoot,54 invalidating a new twenty-eight-sided municipal bound-
ary that excluded virtually all black residents from the city limits,
and Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward Counly,15 in-
validating the closing of all of the county's public schools to avoid their
desegregation, the Court explicitly considered government motivation
and seemed to rely on its finding of improper motive in holding the
actions unconstitutional.a56 These three cases seem to stand for the
proposition that illicit legislative motivation may be so easy to ascertain
in certain situationsa5 that courts are justified in abandoning their nor-
mal reluctance to examine motivation and in declaring an act uncon-
stitutional on the basis of that motivation.158 However, in the most
recent case on the subject, Palmer v. Thompson,09 the Court rejected
this interpretation. While admitting that cases like Gomillion and
Griffin appear to find motivation relevant to the constitutionality of
government enactments, the Court maintained that the principal focus
of even those cases was on effect rather than motive, and it reaffirmed
the O'Brien rule that bad motivation will not invalidate a legislative
act that can be justified in terms of legitimate purposes.1 00
154. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). The Court held that the new boundary deprived blacks of
their right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.
155. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
156. See discussion in T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDoM OF ExPRFssioN 419 (1970);
Ely, supra note 141, at 1209, 1331-34. For another First Amendment case in which mo-
tivation appears to have played a role, see Oestereich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 US.
233 (1968) (dictum that draft reclassification for the purpose of punishing anti-war pro.
testors is unconstitutional).
157. Bad motivation may be comparatively easy to ascertain when the method chosen
by the legislature to further its professed goals is particularly unusual-like the drawing
of a twenty-eight-sided municipal boundary or the closing of all schools in one district
in a state-or when there exists an unusual amount of evidence indicating such bad
motivation, as was probably true in Grosiean. But see Ely, supra note 142, at 1332-33,
in which the author discusses some of the compelling evidence of illicit intent In
Gros'ean but concludes that such evidence should not alone suffice to void a statute.
158. In a recent critique of the Court's approach to legislative motivation, Professor
Paul Brest suggests that proof of illicit motivation should always be deemed relevant
to a challenge to the constitutionality of a legislative act. He contends that such an act
should be declared unconstitutional if the complainant can "establish by clear and
convincing evidence that [an illegitimate] objective played an affirmative role in the
decision-making process." Brest, supra note 145, at 130-31. This formula would obvi-
ously produce results different from those dictated by the O'Brien rule, and might prove
helpful in understanding the Court's decisions in Gomillion, Griffin, and Grosjean. Coin-
pare Ely, supra note 142.
159. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
160. Id. at 225. In Palmer, the Court upheld Jackson, Mississippi's decision to close
down its public swimming pools instead of allowing them to be integrated, ostensibly
because they could not be run economically on an integrated basis, because Jackson had
shown the required legitimate justification and its action did not treat blacks differently
from whites. Although the Palmer Court tried to distinguish Griffin on the grotnd
that there the state had gone beyond merely closing public facilities and had supported
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In its own interpretation of the case law, the Hentoff court con-
cluded that the Supreme Court's general warnings against probing into
motivation did not bar a finding of "exposure for exposure's sake" as
to an act of disclosure for which no legitimate purposes existed. The
court found that the publication of H.R. 91-1607 (the original ver-
sion of H.R. 91-1732) was such an act, as proved by the report's fail-
ure to recommend any specific legislation and its admission that its
findings could not establish a connection between campus speaking
engagements and the financing of subversive organizations. 01 The
court concluded that the only conceivable purpose for publishing
the report was the illegitimate one of encouraging private sanctions
against the listed speakers.' 02 These conclusions and the finding that
the report had a chilling effect upon the speakers' First Amendment
rights were deemed sufficient to justify issuance of the requested in-
junction against publication of the report.
This reasoning entails serious difficulties. The Hentoff court
made the case easy by concluding that no legitimate function could
have been served by publication of H.R. 91-1607. But that conclusion
does not seem justified. Even granting that the evidence amassed in
H.R. 91-1607 was of highly questionable value and that the report's
authors admitted their inability to establish any connection between
the listed speakers and the funding of allegedly subversive organiza-
tions, it would still appear to be beyond the competence and proper
function of a court to determine that no Congressman could find the
report of any use in drafting legislation, which is H.R. 91-1607's
avowed and undeniably legitimate purpose. 0 3 No rule exists, nor
should one be established, that requires Congressmen to base their
legislative decisions only upon facts and opinions exhibiting a judi-
cially approved level of accuracy or completeness. Nor does it seem
advisable to insist that only those reports that recommend specific
pieces of legislation can form part of the pool of information upon
which legislators may act. Even the recitation of the individuals' names
and the amounts of their honoraria, while not absolutely essential to
the legislative process, would undoubtedly contribute to the decision
of at least a few Congressmen to support or oppose future legislation
private schools that discriminated, it is difficult to ignore the Grifin opinion's explict
finding of illicit motivation and the similarity of the fact patterns in Griffin and Palmer.
For an extended critique of Palmer see Brest, supra note 145, at 95-102.
161. H.R. 91-1732, at 10.
162. Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175, 1182 (D).D.C. 1970).
163. H.R. 91-1732, at 2.
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on "subversives." Similarly, such specificity in the legislative history
might assist the executive in administering the resulting legislation
or the judiciary in interpreting its function and scope. Finally, specific
information in congressional reports might contribute to the public's
understanding of the operation of congressional committees and to its
ability to evaluate legislation and legislators.
Given this set of significant and legitimate governmental purposes,
there would appear to be little basis under the existing case law for
enjoining most congressional blacklists on the ground of improper
motivation. Like disclosure through committee investigations, pub-
lication of committee reports can always be defended by reference to
the general utility of information, unless in an unusual case like
DeGregory v. Attorney General'0 4 the court can honestly find that
nothing in the subject matter of the inquiry serves a proper legislative
purpose. The few statutory cases that examine motivation do not sug-
gest a contrary conclusion. For while some blacklists may be published
under circumstances which provide such undeniable proof of bad
motivation that courts, following Grosjean, Gomillion and Griffin,
might feel justified in enjoining them on that ground alone, a careful
legislature could easily avoid that pitfall.'0 5 Furthermore, the Court
is unlikely to retract its repeated claim that these cases do not represent
exceptions to the O'Brien rule.10
Although these strict requirements indicate that most congressional
blacklists will not be found unconstitutional solely on the basis of bad
motivation, the Hentoff report itself may constitute one of those few
blacklists which should be enjoined on that basis. The report involved
in that case contains within its official text a statement which provides
particularly clear evidence of illicit motivation. Both versions of the
report state:
The Committee believes that the limited sampling [in this survey]
is sufficient to alert the Congress, college and university admin-
istrators, faculty, alumni, students, and parents to the probable
extent of campus guest oratory in promoting the radical, revolu-
tionary movement.167
164. 385 US. 825 (1966). See note 148 supra.
165. The authors of the Hentoff report, however, were not so careful, as the quotation
on this page indicates.
166. See pp. 217-18 supra.
167. H.R. 91-1782, at 16.
220
Vol. 81: 188, 1971
Blacklisting and Publication of Congressional Reports
This statement, read in the context of the report's description of stu-
dent violence and campus bombings, can only be seen as an appeal for
those involved in the control of educational institutions to take action
against radical campus speakers. This is a blatant encouragement of
sanctions, an undertaking forbidden by the First Amendment.",,
Unlike the recorded statements of any single drafter of that document,
such an appeal written into the report itself gives the formal approval
of the entire committee, and indeed of the entire House of Repre-
sentatives which passed a resolution to publish H.R. 91-1732, to a
straightforward statement of illegitimate motivation. Not only does
this passage offer powerful proof of unconstitutional motivation, but
it would also presumably increase the potential harm to plaintiffs by
stamping private retribution with official government approval.
This problem of written proof of illicit motivation within the text
of an othervise lawful legislative document was confronted recently
by the California Supreme Court. In Parr v. Municipal Court,00 the
court voided a municipal ordinance of the City of Carmel prohibiting,
among other things, sitting on the grass in the village park, solely be-
cause of a preambular "statement of urgency" which proclaimed that
the law had been passed because of "an extraordinary influx of unde-
sirable and unsanitary visitors to the city, sometimes known as 'hip-
pies.' ",170 The court ruled that this ordinance violated the right of those
whom the Carmel authorities deemed to be "hippies" to the equal pro-
tection of the laws for two independent reasons: (1) a statement within
a law which appears officially to encourage the infliction of depriva-
tion upon a certain group is likely to foster discriminatory enforce-
ment of that law against that group; and (2) a statement of intent
written into a government document can provide a sufficiently reliable
indication of bad motivation to overcome the normal judicial reluc-
tance to examine legislative intent and suffice to render it unconstitu-
tional as a deliberate deprivation of individual rights.
It is not clear how such written proof of illicit motivation would
affect the outcome under the O'Brien test. The Hentoff court, as we
have seen, held that the offending sentence is further proof that H.R.
91-1607 had no legitimate purpose. However, as suggested above,' 7 '
168. See pp. 214-15 supra.
169. 3 CaLd 861, 479 P.2d 353, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153, cert. denied sub noin. City of
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Parr, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
170. 3 Cal.3d at 863, 479 P.2d at 354, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
171. See pp. 219-20 supra.
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legitimate purposes can be found for the report in general, and it is
questionable whether the Supreme Court would either find that a
single sentence negates the claim of good intentions or, if so finding,
conclude that the legislature is held to its stated purposes even if other
proper ones can be conceived of by the reviewing court.11 2
It can be argued, however, that written proof of bad motivation,
even if found only in a single sentence, should be sufficient to render
a congressional action unconstitutional. It must be remembered that
the reluctance of the judiciary to examine legislative motivation is
based upon the three considerations discussed above-ascertainability,
futility, and disutility173-all of which assume far less importance
when a claim of bad motivation is supported by written proof in the
text of the challenged document. While an institutional desire to "ex-
pose for exposure's sake" may not be properly ascertained on the
basis of speeches given by only a few of the men who supported the
challenged document, a statement of bad motivation in the text of the
document itself carries with it, at least by implication, the endorse-
ment of every Congressman who voted for its publication. The argu-
ment of disutility is similarly weakened. While it would be unwise to
invalidate congressional action that has no harmful effects simply be-
cause an objectionable speech was made on its behalf, a written state-
ment of illicit intent may, as the Parr court explained, itself increase
the harmful effects of an action by offering governmental endorsement
of the sentiments expressed in that statement.17 4 The claim of futility
can also be countered. While it may be futile to reject a document
solely because of speeches made in its defense (since Congress can
merely resubmit the document after cautioning its supporters to make
wiser speeches), a report with an offending passage in its text cannot
be resubmitted exactly in its original form. At the very least the of-
fending passage must be deleted, somewhat changing the substance,
form, and even the impact of the report. Furthermore, the entire
172. See Ely, supra note 142, at 1276-78. See also Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), in which the Court upheld a literacy test as a qua Ifica-
tion for voting against a claim of bad motivation despite the fact that the challenged
state constitutional provision also included a clearly illepal "grandfather clause" and a
statement that the entire provision constituted "one indivisible plan for the regulation
of the suffrage." N.C. CONsT. art. VI, § 5. However, the literacy test and grandfather
clause still represented two separate voting qualifications, while the statement of urgency
in Parr and the offending paragraph in Hentoff were avowedly statements of purposes
for the documents as a whole, and thus provided far better proof as to the motivation
behind all sections of those documents.
173. See pp. 215-16 supra.
174. 3 Cal.3d at 868-69, 479 P.2d at 358, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
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argument of futility should be seriously questioned: it is never truly
futile to vindicate a valid constitutional principle, and perhaps a judi-
cial reprimand, even when applied in response to mere supporting
speeches, might encourage some Congressmen to reconsider the wis-
dom of the entire document involved.l'" The city of Carmel, it should
be noted, substantially diluted its ordinance when re-enacting it after
the Parr decision.
7 6
3. Less Drastic Means
Although some documents, like H.R. 91-1732, which contain written
proof of bad motivation may be subject to injunction, it seems clear
that proof of an impermissible motivation will not invalidate the great
majority of congressional blacklists. Courts have, however, developed
another limitation on governmental actions, the less drastic means test,
which is specifically designed to deal with situations in which the gov-
emnment can present legitimate justifications for actions that indirectly
infringe constitutional rights.
The less drastic means test examines a government act not in terms
of the motivation prompting it but rather in terms of its objective
effects. As traditionally interpreted, it provides that a government act
may be found unconstitutional if its incidental restriction of First
Amendment rights is greater than is necessary for the accomplishment
of the government's legitimate purposes.'7T Put another way, the gov-
ernment may be required to choose a method of achieving its ends
175. Professor Paul Brest goes further and suggests that when the decision of a
government body is accompanied by sufficient indicia of bad motivation to warrant a
declaration of unconstitutionality. "the court should enjoin fthat body] from making
the same decision again unless [it] comes forward with persuasive evidence that this time
it will be made only for legitimate reasons." Brest, supra note 145, at 126. But see Parr
v. Municipal Court, 3 Cal.3d 861, 873-74, 479 P.2d 353, 362, 92 Cal. Rptr. 153, 162 (1971)
(Burke, J., dissenting).
176. On December 8, 1971, the city of Carmel enacted a new ordinance embodying
many of the provisions in the law voided by Parr. G tIEI.-nmTE-Sra, CAL, MU.ICiPAL
CODE §§ 697.01, 697.02 (1972). formerly Carmel-by-the-Sea, Cal., Ordinance 173 C.S., July
31, 1968, as amended, Ordinance 175 CS., Aug. 7, 1968, and Ordinance 215 C.S., March
4, 1970. However, the statement of urgency was dropped altogether, no mention of
"hippies" is made in the new orainance, and the provisions which would have proved
most onerous to such visitors-criminal sanctions for sitting on the grass and steps of
the city park-have been altered to forbid only walking on the laws during seeding
time. In other words, the fears of the dissenters in Parr were unfounded: Camel has
been able to fashion a new ordinance for the protection of its natural beauty while
eliminating those sections of the old law which most directly threatened to turn it into
a vehicle for the persecution of "hippies." Copies of the old and new ordinances are
on file with the Yale Law Journal.
177. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See also Richardson, Freedom of
Expression and the Function of the Courts, 65 HARv. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1951); Note.
Legislative Inquiry into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity from Committee
Interrogation, 65 YALE L.J. 1159, 1173-75 (1956).
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which inflicts a less drastic infringement on the First Amendment
rights of its citizens. Indeed, this rule was expressly re-affirmed in
O'Brien s78 although its cursory application may well have altered the
outcome of the case. 179
Although the Supreme Court is often hesitant to characterize its
reasoning as a balancing process, any evaluation of the reasonableness
of a legislative method will inevitably involve a comparison of the
values and costs of the alternative courses of action. As one commenta-
tor has observed, however, what actually occurs in these cases is not a
broad balancing of the fundamental values involved (e.g., national
security versus free speech) but rather a more limited balancing of
"the state's interest in the added effectiveness of the chosen means
against the individual interest in the use of less drastic ones."' 8 0 Thus,
in the leafletting cases,181 the Court's decision to overturn statutes
which banned the distribution of leaflets did not sacrifice entirely the
governmental interest in litter-free streets, but only imposed the slight
additional cost of using other means of solving the litter problem (such
as criminal sanctions against litterers) which have a less drastic effect
on public expression.
In order to perform such balancing in an intelligent manner,
courts need some idea of the available alternatives. It thus seems
inadequate for a court simply to evaluate the challenged course of
action, find it too drastic on its face, and then return the issue to the
legislative arena.'8 2 On the other hand, the need to consider alterna-
tive approaches does not require usurpation of the legislative func-
tion of selecting the best method.18 3 The most satisfactory approach,
178. 391 U.S. at 377. See p. 217 supra.
179. See Ely, supra note 142, at 1340-41.
180. Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YAx L.J. 464, 468 (1969).
181. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
182. This is essentially what the Court did in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258,
267 (1967), in which it used the less drastic means test to overturn a federal statute
making it a criminal offense for a member of a "communist-action organization" to
engage in any employment in a defense facility. The Court stated:
The Government has told us that Congress, in passing [this statute], made a con-
sidered judgment that one possible alternative to that statute-an industrial security
screening program-would be inadequate and ineffective to protect against sabotage
in defense facilities. It is not our function to examine the validity of that congres-
sional judgment. Neither is it our function to determine whether an indtstrial
screening program exhausts the possible alternatives to the statute under review.
We are concerned solely with determining whether the statute before us has ex-
ceeded the bounds imposed by the Constitution when First Amendment rights are
at stake. The task of writing legislation which will stay within those bounds has
been committed to Congress.
183. Courts of equity clearly have the power to suggest specific procedures for the
coordinate branches of government and even, under limited circumstances, to command
compliance with such suggestions. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 455 (1966),
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therefore (and the one usually followed by the Court), is for a court
to consider the incremental costs and benefits of the various sug-
gested alternatives M and, if it finds any of them to be less drastic
than the challenged action, declare the latter unconstitutional, with-
out imposing a particular alternative.
In applying less drastic means analysis to government publication of
congressional blacklists, courts will have to evaluate the impact of both
the challenged action and the suggested alternatives upon the interests
of the government and the affected individuals. On the one hand are
the basic harms created by such documents: they encourage the inflic-
tion of sanctions upon individuals whose only objectionable acts may
have been the exercise of constitutionally protected rights of expression
and association, and they "chill" the willingness of people-black-
listed and unblacklisted alike-to exercise those rights in the future.18 5
On the other are the legitimate governmental functions served by even
blacklist-type reports: they provide Congressmen, officials of the coor-
for example, the Court listed specific procedures to be followed by police during the
interrogation of suspects in custody, rather than merely declaring existing practices
unconstitutional and allowing the executive or legislature to develop new procedures.
Such judicial specification of procedures for the other branches is, however, usually
limited to circumstances in which vital individual rights are threatened by government
inaction, that is, unwillingness to correct a constitutionally defective practice. In the
landmark reapportionment case of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). the Court
affirmed a district court's power to impose its own temporary plan for the reapportion-
ment of Alabama's state legislature after the legislature itself had failed to produce a
constitutionally acceptable plan. The Court has even tacitly accepted the principle that
legislative inaction may justify the imposition of permanent court-developed reappor-
tionment plans by its failure to reject district court action in such cases as Parsons v.
Buckley, 379 U.S. 359 (1965), and Williams v. Moss, 378 U.S. 558 (1964). See Note, The
Case for District Court Management of the Reapportionment Process, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv.
504 (1966).
Similar court proposals in the absence of legislative action have been accepted in the
field of public school desegregation. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (affirming district court's right to appoint an expert to develop
a desegregation plan and to impose that plan when the school board failed to provide
its own acceptable proposal); Bradley v. School Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2446 (ED. Va. Jan.
5, 1972) (ruling that existing plans to desegregate public schools in the Richmond area
had failed to comply with constitutional standards and ordering that the city and two
county school districts be consolidated); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967), afrd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) C'frecdom of choice"
system declared inadequate and busing ordered among District schools).
184. Several methods are available for insuring the formulation of alternatives. Courts
could place the burden of proof on one of the parties--either requiring plaintiffs to
prove the existence of a viable, less drastic means or demanding that the governmental
defendant bear the burden of disproving the existence of such a method. Note, supra
note 180, at 474. Although avoiding judicial performance of legislative tasks, both of
these procedures unnecessarily restrict judicial analysis to options conceived by the
party shouldering the burden of proof and waste party efforts in establishing as facts
mere policy proposals. It would seem both more efficient and more useful to the de-
cisionmaking process if judges were to consider all possible alternatives-whether sug-
gested by a party, an amicus curiae, a legislator, or the judge himself-that 'ould
arguably accomplish the government's goals.
185. See pp. 209-10 supra.
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dinate branches of government, and the general public with informa-
tion which may be useful in the lawmaking process."80
As noted, a less drastic means analysis of a course of action requires
comparison with alternative possibilities. Several are available. First,
a congressional report given general public distribution could be pub-
lished without listing the names of specific individuals or groups if a
serious infringement of First Amendment freedoms would otherwise
result.187 A report which excluded such names could also be printed in
the Congressional Record, if Congress wished to do so. Second, the re-
port could be printed in full, complete with whatever names are
deemed necessary to substantiate its findings, but distribution would be
limited to the members of Congress. The text of the report, under this
option, would not be placed in the Congressional Record. Third, two
different versions of the report could be prepared for independent pub.
lication: one containing whatever names are necessary, to be distributed
to Congressmen and their staffs; and the other without specification of
individdals and groups, to be distributed to all other recipients, includ-
ing members of the public. If desired, this version could be included
in the Congressional Record as well. 88
These options represent alternatives to the full publication of con-
gressional blacklists that would greatly reduce the threat to individual
liberties posed by such documents. Under the less drastic means test,
such unregulated blacklisting must be declared unconstitutional unless
it can be shown that each of these alternatives would result in such a
decline in the effectiveness with which the legitimate functions of
Congress could be pursued as to outweigh, in some sense, the threat-
ened infringement upon personal rights. An analysis of the effects of
186. See pp. 195-96 supra.
187. To conform with the bill of attainder cases, individuals and groups would also
not be described with such particularity as effectively to reveal their identities without
actually naming them. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442, 449-51 (1965).
188. Congress could adopt any of these three options with regard to the independent
publication of reports but permit the entire text of the report, including names, to be
placed in the Congressional Record for general distribution. This last alternative would
be acceptable only if courts were to interpret the journal of proceedings clause to
bar all judicial interference with the publication and distribution of the congressional
Record. Although this final option would severely limit the effectiveness of an injunction
against the separate publication of a report, it would not render such an injnction
wholly futile. Some people who would have read the report will fail to read the Record,
others will obey the spirit of even a partial injunction and be dissuaded from privately
distributing the report, and still others will consider it "tainted" by judicial condem-
nation and thus less reliable. However, since full publication in the Record would be
tantamount to congressional evasion of a court injunction, and since courts probably
do have the power to prevent such evasion, see p. 204 supra, this alternative will not
be considered further.
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the alternatives upon the three informational functions served by
congressional reports'8 9 indicates that at least two of these options
would produce such minimal costs as to render them "less drastic"
under any scheme of value measurement.
Under all three alternatives, legislators would have the benefit of
the entire report for both the drafting and evaluation of appropriate
legislation.190 The only interference with the lawmaking process would
result from the inability of the legislators to get "feedback" from their
constituents. This, however, would only be a significant interference
with the legislative function under the second option, which would
keep the entire report out of public circulation. Constituent response
would not be significantly altered or decreased if the public did not
know the actual names of those accused of wrongdoing, so long as the
existence of that general type of wrongdoing is publicized.
The executive and judicial branches would also be largely unaffected
by a restriction on their access to the names listed in congressional
reports. The function of those branches is to interpret legislation so
that it may be properly enforced. Insofar as they must go beyond the
text of the statute to understand the exact scope of activities that the
legislature intended to regulate, they need no more than the general
descriptions provided by most congressional reports and floor debates.
For that reason, however, the second option-which would exclude
extra-congressional distribution-would be very costly, in essence
destroying a major segment of the legislative history of statutes based
on the reports in question.
The inability of the general public to view the full factual substan-
tiation for certain reports may entail more serious costs. The interfer-
ence with the public's "right to know"'9' 1 that would result from the
excision of names from a congressional report would not itself be sig-
nificant, both because the great bulk of the report's factual findings
could be published without specification of names and because it is
extremely doubtful whether the excised material could itself properly
be considered vital to public evaluation of government. 02 Yet a lack
189. See pp. 195-96 supra.
190. Although publication of the names would be entirely excluded under the first
option, it is hard to imagine that the offensive information would not be made in-
formally available to all Congressmen by the committee members who prepared the report.
191. For a discussion of the "right to know" doctrine, see Hennings, supra note 74.
See also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
192. fore likely, the information would be sought for the very reason that its pub-
lication might be thought illegitimate-to expose and punish individuals holding un-
popular beliefs.
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of specification in a report distributed to the public might lessen the
impact of the report (and thus the perceived need for subsequent
legislation) and might also reduce the credibility of the report, its
authors, or government in general. This problem is well illustrated by
the Hentoff document; for the very listing of specific speakers that
infringed upon First Amendment freedoms also supplied the commit-
tee's findings with vivid evidence which could hardly have been
equalled by the vague claim that sixty-five unnamed but known revo-
lutionaries had recently spoken on several college campuses. Yet the
loss of both impact and credibility could be substantially reduced
if the reason for the lack of substantiation-protection of individual
rights-were set forth in the published version. Indeed, congressional
reports are frequently kept confidential for a variety of reasons, often
touching upon matters of national security, and their lack of credibility
among elements of the population is due only to the apparent overuse
of that label, a problem as yet unknown in the free speech area. Finally,
these costs must be considered in context: only a few reports can be
termed blacklists and only a very small part of the information in such
documents need be excised to eliminate the threat to individual ex-
pression.
Given that under the first and third options there would be essen-
tially no interference with the legitimate la3vmaking functions of
the various branches of government and at most a speculative effect
on public respect for government,193 it would seem that there are
viable alternatives imposing less drastic infringements on First
Amendment freedoms'1. which would require an injunction against
full publication of congressional blacklists.
A final argument against restraining the publication of congres-
sional blacklists touches upon the doctrine of futility, for "[i]t is a
traditional axiom of equity that a court of equity will not do a use-
193. The only other cost under the third option would be the fairly minimal expense
of publishing a second version of a report with the harmful section or appendix simply
deleted.
194. Although this Note deals only with the infringement of First Amendment free-
doms and violation of the bill of attainder clause, it is possible that other rights might
be sufficiently threatened by blacklisting to justify the deletion of names in government
documents. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 US. 433 (1971) (right to due process
of law); Doe v. McMillan, No. 71-1027 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 20, 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting)
(right to privacy). A privacy claim, however, is likely to be of little avail to public figures
blacklisted because of acts of public expression. The due process claim, moreover, would
seem inapplicable to legislative activity since the bill of attainder clause bars any depri-
vational specification regardless of the procedure followed.
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less thing."'19 5 In an ideal world, perhaps, the fact that a court has
banned the publication of certain harmful information would com-
pletely prevent its disclosure. In reality, however, there are several
ways in which information collected by a congressional body might
be released. At one extreme, Congress could simply defy the court
order and publish the offending material, as it chose to do after the
Hentoff ruling by the resounding vote of 302 to 54.100 Moreover, any
Congressman or congressional agent could obtain a copy of an en-
joined report and publish it privately at his own expense, 0 7 or ac-
complish virtually the same result by releasing it to the press. Al-
though such an act might subject the individual who released the
report to a libel suit, 98 it probably would not be termed an official
act of Congress and would therefore be free from injunction based
upon the First Amendment and bill of attainder arguments present-
ed above.' 99
Even granting these difficulties, however, an injunction against
the official publication of a blacklist would be far from the "useless
thing" forbidden by the doctrine of futility. It cannot be assumed
that Congress will choose to make a practice of defying court orders
by publishing enjoined materials, and the judiciary may not guide
its decisions by such an assumption.200 The private publication or
release of enjoined reports may well be deterred effectively by a
combination of moral suasion and the threat of personal suits. To-
gether, these factors should substantially curtail the public disclosure
of harmful information. Furthermore, as noted earlier,2 0 1 part of the
harm of a blacklist lies in its official nature, in the fact that a deroga-
tory statement appears to enjoy the imprimatur of the government.
Yet no official publication of an enjoined report could occur unless
Congress were to violate the express terms of the injunction. Finally,
195. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 744 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
196. 116 CONG. REc. HI1624-25 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1970).
197. Presumably, use by an agent of the official franking privilege to distribute
privately published documents would render him liable to private suit. The specch and
debate clause would provide no protection either because the agent was not authorized
to use the privilege for that purpose or because he was not acting in the capacity of a
confidential aide involved in the legislative process. See pp. 198-202 supra. E£en a Con-
gressman might be subject to injunction, since such use of his franking privilege is
arguably beyond his "role" and "power." See pp. 194-95 supra.
198. See note 24 supra.
199. See Note, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 606, 612-13 (1971).
200. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892), in which the Court said that it
is an "inadmissible suggestion" that action might be taken in disregard of a judicial
decision.
20'. See pp. 221-22 supra.
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the legal and moral authority of a court injunction cannot be ig-
nored. If the publication of certain types of harmful information is
enjoined, Congressmen may be less likely in the future to attempt to
publish blacklists.
While these practical considerations are not irrelevant, the pri-
mary judicial concern should still be the balance of harm to indi-
vidual liberties against the impairment of legitimate legislative func-
tions. It cannot be denied that judicial limitations on the publishing
power of Congress--either by forcing the use of alternative pro-
cedures which satisfy the less drastic means test or by declaring
specific blacklists to be ill-motivated or bills of attainder-would, to
some degree, impair the efficient operation of the legislature. More-
over, it would limit the important contribution that Congress can
and should make to the general public discussion of persons and
events of national significance. These costs need not be large, how-
ever, to protect fully the First Amendment rights threatened by
blacklisting. They are not too great a price to pay in order to prevent
substantial harm to affected individuals and to place some reasonable
limitations upon the power of Congress to publish blacklists.
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